What do Australia, South Korea and Japan have in common? For starters, they’re each a ‘middle power’ in the Indo-Pacific—relatively influential states with the kind of economic and diplomatic heft to shape the region’s dynamics. They steer great power priorities, uphold stabilising norms and rules, encourage cooperation and give life into minilateral groupings.
So too, middle powers play an important role as development partners. In dollar terms, Japan, Australia and South Korea rank among the top OECD-DAC development spenders. They are also the top three donors focused on development in the Indo-Pacific region.
We often hear about the Great Powers’ development cooperation as extensions of their efforts for economic, military and narrative influence within the region. But, what about middle powers? Are they engaged development partners driven by geopolitical interests? A desire to reinforce rules and stability? To seize new economic opportunities? Or simply a genuine commitment to shared progress?
We asked the experts: Australia, South Korea and Japan: what’s behind middle power development motivations?
It’s no secret that Japan’s development endeavour is inextricably linked to the country’s national security interests. This is hardly news per se, but with increasing Chinese encroachments regionwide, North Korea’s bellicosity, and the ongoing prosecution of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Japan does not have the luxury of dissociating its development endeavours from its present-day geopolitical considerations.
That said, the origin story of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) scheme was not born out of today’s security environment. In fact, it can be traced back to October 1954, when the country signed onto the Colombo Plan— a regional fora that enabled Japan to deliver economic and technical assistance to what is now South and Southeast Asian countries to earnestly make amends after World War II. And now, Japan’s ODA serves as the backbone of the country’s regional diplomacy, particularly in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific Islands.
In recent decades, Japan is leveraging its comparative advantages via ODA: high-quality infrastructure and digital connectivity. One ongoing project that neatly fits into both categories is the submarine cable that Japan is creating for Palau through the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership with Australia and the United States
Amid global cuts, a 6% ODA decrease in 2024, and with security-forward initiatives, like its Official Security Assistance (OSA), gaining traction, some might wonder about the future of Japan’s historically reliable provision of development assistance. Time will tell if Japan can fine-tune its development regime to ensure that the country can meet the heavy demands of safeguarding its security interests and justify a continued spend as the third most generous donor in the OECD-DAC.
Eleanor is a non-resident fellow at econVue and is based in the Washington, DC area. Eleanor is focused on US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, as well as Japanese and Australian foreign policy. She previously worked with The Asia Group, the Asia Society Policy Institute, CSIS’s Japan Chair, and Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. At the Lab, we love listening to Eleanor’s podcast, The Hughes News, and her efforts to draw US foreign policy attention to the Pacific.
Middle powers can’t get what they want through tantrums and tariffs, and they aren’t strong enough to impose their will through military might. Instead, they have to engage, collaborate and persuade. Here development cooperation offers a versatile set of tools.
Australia has gone through several distinct phases involving different motivations for development. In the immediate post-war phase, Liberal and Labor governments felt responsibilities to help new nations get established and tackle widespread absolute poverty. Later, under Gareth Evans, development was seen as an important means of increasing our own security and prosperity by pursuing stability in Asia and Pacific.
The Howard government initially exhibited aid scepticism, seeing private sector growth as the development panacea. In the wake of dramatic trade driven international poverty reduction, aid was relegated to a charity sideline of little interest or consequence. However, when the Indian Ocean tsunami offered the opportunity of a development-driven relationship reset with Indonesia, Howard wisely grabbed it.
Momentarily, under PM Rudd, poverty reduction made a motivational come back, but simultaneously Australia’s aspirations went global, including shaping international policy and institutions, and elevating Australia’s clout. Such grandiose ambition was immediately crushed by incoming PM Abbott, who reverted to the charity motivation for aid. The current government talks about the promotion of Australian values but seems half hearted about it— a symptom of a lack of motivation.
Can Australia shrug this off? It’s going to have to if it wants to achieve its security, diplomatic and economic goals in East Asia. An ambitious, forward-looking government could do so by moving decisively away from contracted aid projects to a whole-of-nation enterprise. This would build a stronger, more integrated, more inclusive and sustainable region. That ought to be a powerful motivation for reform and rebuilding.
Richard is a leading voice in Australia’s development and international relations reform debate. He’s been with the Lab since the start, and he is a relentless source of ideas. Richard’s knowledge of the Australian development program and Southeast Asia is unparalleled. For the record, we don’t think he is a crusty old hand, but at the Lab, we do learn a lot from Richard’s experience, and love his quick wit, policy ambition and pragmatism.
The second Trump administration has abandoned the United States’ 80-year leadership role maintaining the rules-based international order. According to a 5 September report by US media outlet Politico, the draft of the new US Defense Strategy proposes a radical shift in US priorities—from deterring China to focusing on the defence of the US homeland and the Western Hemisphere. Concerns abound about the future of US support for NATO allies; the proposed 2026 US federal budget contains additional cuts to organisations that promote democracy abroad; and this sits on top of cuts to USAID set to weaken protections for human rights, independent journalism and access to education in areas of the world that need it most.
The United States used to be the world’s #1 supporter of democracy. What then will happen to those countries that still cherish democracy and a rules-based order, and once depended on US support for assistance – both in normative and material terms? Will they simply try to survive on their own while watching the world drift into an embrace of authoritarianism reminiscent of the 1930s? I don’t think so. This is precisely why countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan must stand together and explore what they can achieve through deeper cooperation.
There are many fields where close cooperation among the three countries could yield not only short-term benefits but also long-term strategic advantages— from supply chain resilience to promoting freedom of navigation and human rights. Yet, one particularly promising area could be development assistance.
All three countries have their own technical strengths: Australia in governance programming, Japan in infrastructure and South Korea in digital technology and civil society engagement. Closer trilateral engagements, coordinating approaches, and sharing lessons and resources makes sense to advance common priorities and make up for the vacuum left by the United States. Without such action, middle powers risk allowing the region to be shaped by spheres of influence. And the United States has proved it’s not too interested in staying around to win that competition.
Professor Yoon Young-kwan served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea from 2003 to 2004. He is currently Chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He has had a vast career in both academia and policy, with a focus on the international political economy, foreign policy analysis and East-Asian regional cooperation. At the Lab, we admire Young-kwan's dedication to global diplomatic discourse.
